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The present research explores whether the type of relationship one holds with deceptive or honest actors
inﬂuences cross-cultural differences in reward and punishment. Research suggests that Americans reward
honest actors more than they punish deceptive perpetrators, whereas East Asians reward and punish equally
(Wang & Leung, 2010). Our research suggests that the type of relationship with the actor matters for East
Asians, but not for Americans. East Asians exhibit favoritism toward their friends by rewarding more than
punishing them, but reward and punish equally when the actors are strangers (Experiment 1 and 2);
Americans reward more than they punish regardless of the type of relationship (Experiment 2). Furthermore,
the ﬁndings were replicated when the proposed mechanism – social mobility – was manipulated within the
same culture (Experiment 3). We discuss the implications of these ﬁndings for understanding how friends
versus strangers are rewarded and punished in an increasingly relationally complex world.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Given the recent international economic turmoil, questions have
arisen whether more rewards and punishments should be used to
regulate behaviors. Wang and Leung (2010) showed that the use of
rewards and punishments is inﬂuenced by culture: North Americans
reward honesty more than they punish deception, but East Asians
reward and punish equivalently. These cultural differences were
explained by using the theoretical framework of social mobility
(e.g., Chen, Chiu, & Chan, 2009; Oishi, 2010; Schug, Yuki, Horikawa, &
Takemura, 2009). Building on this social mobility perspective, this
paper examines how the type of relationship one holds with the
honest or deceptive actor inﬂuences cross-cultural differences in
reward and punishment.
Countries vary in levels of mobility. Individuals in highly mobile
countries can easily enter into and exit from relationships (Schug
et al., 2009), jobs (Chen et al., 2009), or residences (Oishi, 2010; Oishi
& Kisling, 2009). Relationships in mobile cultures (e.g., America;
Whyte, 1956) are more transient than those in stable cultures (e.g.,
East Asia), and therefore, involve less collective duties (Ho, Rousseau,
& Levesque, 2006). In a mobile culture, when wrongdoers engage in
misconduct, individuals can avoid them due to their less binding
social network, thus sparing the use of punishment (Wang & Leung,
2010). On the other hand, when others are honest, it is wise to invest
in maintaining positive relationships with them due to the fragility
of relationships in mobile cultures (Macy & Sato, 2002; Schug, Yuki,
& Maddux, 2010). Indeed, people engage in active self-disclosure
efforts to cultivate vulnerable relationships in relationally mobile
cultures (Schug et al., 2010). We propose that an alternative way to
signal relationship commitment is through the use of more reward
and less punishment. This theorizing is supported by evidence that
Americans reward more than they punish strangers (Wang, Galinsky,
& Murnighan, 2009; Wang & Leung, 2010).
Given Americans' generous behavior toward strangers, one
compelling question is whether such generosity is similar or ampliﬁed
for friends. In a mobile environment, individuals can easily establish
positive relationships and exit from negative ones with both friends
and strangers, so we expect behavior toward friends versus strangers
to be less demarcated. Indeed, compared to Chinese, Americans feel
less of a sense of duty toward in-groupmembers (such as friends) and
less concern for in-group harmony (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier,
2002). Furthermore, when Asian–American biculturals were primed
with American (vs. Asian) culture, cooperative behavior was less
differentiated between friends and strangers in a Prisoner's Dilemma
game (Wong &Hong, 2005), suggesting that highlymobile individuals
are less sensitive to the friend–stranger distinction.
However, less mobile individuals (e.g., East Asians), on one hand,
feel obligated to maintain collective social order; but on the other
hand, are not inclined to reward honest strangers with whom they
cannot establish a relationship easily, suggesting that they punish and
reward strangers equivalently (Wang & Leung, 2010). From the social
mobility perspective, it is possible that less mobile individuals are
more sensitive to the friend–stranger distinction because they cannot
enter into or exit from relationships easily. As they are motivated to
maintain strong ties with their in-groupmembers (Leung, 1997), they
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need to recognize the boundary between their ingroup and outgroup,
and then discriminately show more favoritism toward their ingroup
but less so for their outgroup.
In particular, in collectivistic cultures (which are generally less
mobile), a concern for preserving in-group harmony and willingness
to sacriﬁce for in-group members emerge (Leung & Bond, 1984;
Wong & Hong, 2005). For example, biculturals primed with Asian (vs.
American) culture were more cooperative toward friends but not
strangers in a Prisoner's Dilemma game (Wong & Hong, 2005). More-
over, when interacting with out-group members (e.g., strangers),
East Asians show a stronger tendency to come into conﬂict (Leung,
1988). These ﬁndings suggest that low mobility is related to a higher
sensitivity to the friend–stranger distinction.
In summary, we systematically examine East Asians' and Amer-
icans' rewards and punishments in reaction to an actor who is either a
friend or a stranger. Based on the social mobility perspective, we
predict that East Asians (Experiments 1 and 2) will be more sensitive
to the friend–stranger distinction, thereby displaying favoritism
toward friends with more reward than punishment, but displaying
impartiality toward strangers with equivalent reward and punish-
ment. However, Americans (Experiment 2) will be less sensitive to the
friend–stranger distinction and thus display their default tendency to
reward more than punish regardless of their relationship with the
actors. Experiment 3 also directly tests our propositions based on the
social mobility framework, exploring for the ﬁrst time how social
mobility serves as a mechanism that drives disparate reward and
punishment patterns.
Experiment 1
Extending Wang and Leung's (2010) ﬁndings, Experiment 1 tested
East Asians' responses to deception and honesty from a stranger versus
a friend. We predicted that East Asians would reward and punish in
equivalent amounts when the actor is a stranger (replicating Wang &
Leung, 2010), but would reward more than they punish friends.
Method
Participants and design
Ninety-eight Chinese students (47 females) from Xi'an Medical
University and Xi'an Jiao Tong University1 completed the 2 (Behavior:
deception/honesty)×2 (Relationship: stranger/friend) between-par-
ticipants study as a course requirement.
Procedure
Adapting Wang and Leung's (2010) procedures, participants read
(in Chinese) about someone who behaved dishonestly or honestly,
which caused the participant to gain or lose ¥500. The deception–
stranger condition read: “You and another individual recently
completed a business deal; you have just discovered that the other
individual was dishonest about some key information. As a result, you
only received ¥1000. You would have received 50% more if the other
individual had been honest.” Thus, in the deception–stranger
condition, they expected ¥1500 and suffered a ¥500 loss. The
honesty–stranger condition read: “You and another individual recently
completed a business deal; you have just discovered that the other
individual was honest about some key information. As a result, you
received ¥1000. You would have received 50% less if the other
individual had been dishonest.” Thus, participants received ¥1000
from interacting with an honest individual; they expected ¥500 and
received a ¥500 gain. In the deception–friend and honesty–friend
conditions, participants read the same scenarios, except that the actor
was a friend that they named beforehand.
Participants could then spend hypothetical money to reward
(following honesty) or punish (following deception) the actor at a
cost to test how participants would reciprocate at their own expense
(e.g., Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). The cost was set at a tenth of the
reward/punishment amount (e.g., Wang et al., 2009; Wang & Leung,
2010). The dependent measure was the amount spent to reward
or punish presented on 11-point scales from ¥0 to ¥1000, in ¥100
increments.
Results and discussion
The reward/punishment amount was submitted to a Behavior×-
Relationship between-participants ANOVA. A two-way interaction
emerged, F(1,94)=8.27, p=.005 (see Fig. 1). Participants rewarded
(M=733.33, SD=261.41) more than they punished (M=188.46,
SD=295.74) friends, t(94)=5.60, pb .001, d=1.95, but rewarded
and punished strangers equally (Mreward=600.00, SDreward=300.00
vs. Mpunish=442.31, SDpunish=430.97), t(94)=1.69, p=.10. The
current ﬁndings in the stranger condition replicated past research
(Wang & Leung, 2010), and importantly, Experiment 1 extended
previous ﬁndings by revealing that Chinese reward more than they
punish their friends.
Analyzing the interaction differently, participants punished friends
less than strangers, t(94)=2.76, p=.007, d=.69. Their tendency to
reward friends more than strangers was not signiﬁcant, t(94)=1.36,
p=.18, although the means were in the predicted direction.
In Experiment 2, we set out to complement these within-culture
ﬁndingswith between-culture ﬁndings and used a different East Asian
sample (Singaporeans) from Experiment 1. We expected that
Americans would reward more than they punish, regardless of the
relationship with the actor. However, East Asians would reward
more than they punish friends, but reward and punish strangers in
equivalent amounts.
Experiment 2
Participants and design
Participants were 302 undergraduate students who completed
the 2 (Behavior: deception/honesty)×2 (Relationship: stranger/
friend)×2 (Culture: American/East Asian) between-participants
design as a requirement for an introductory management course.
One hundred and thirty-eight Caucasian students (88 females) were
from the University of Texas at Austin and 164 students (93 females;
1 Participants were undergraduates (engineering and English majors) and business
graduate students. The reward/punishment responses did not differ by university,
major, or year in school (all interactions, F'sb1).
Fig. 1. The effects of partner's behavior and relationship on amount of response
(Chinese participants), Experiment 1.
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97% Chinese, 3% Malay/Other) were from the National University of
Singapore.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. The scenarios
were presented in English and the currency used was dollars.
Results and discussion
The reward/punishment amount was submitted to a Behavior×-
Relationship×Culture between-participants ANOVA. A signiﬁcant
three-way interaction emerged, F(1,294)=9.76, p=.002 (see
Fig. 2). Decomposing the interaction by Culture, we found that
Americans rewarded (M=65.22, SD=32.54) more than they pun-
ished (M=36.06, SD=37.89), F(1,134)=21.89, pb .001, d=.83. As
predicted, this effect was not moderated by whether the actor was a
stranger or a friend, F(1,134)=1.65, p=.20.
East Asians rewarded (M=67.60, SD=34.91)more than punished
(M=30.79, SD=37.73), F(1,160)=44.04, pb .001, d=1.01. Unlike
Americans, this effect was qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant Behavior×Rela-
tionship interaction, F(1,160)=39.21, pb .001. East Asians rewarded
(M=47.50, SD=34.55) and punished (M=45.56, SD=41.86)
strangers in equivalent amounts, t(160)=.26, p=.80, but rewarded
(M=82.56, SD=27.00) more than they punished friends (M=15.68,
SD=25.64), t(160)=9.48, pb .001, d=2.54. These ﬁndings replicate
those obtained in Experiment 1, suggesting that the pattern of results
is robust. Additionally, East Asians punished their friends less than
strangers, t(160)=4.29, pb .001, d=.86, as in Experiment 1. Further-
more, East Asians rewarded friends more than strangers, t(155)=
4.57, pb .001, d=1.15.
Having established cross-cultural differences in reward/punish-
ment amounts for friends versus strangers, we tested the role of social
mobility more directly by manipulating Americans' perception of
social mobility in Experiment 3.
Experiment 3
Participants and design
Two-hundred and seven American undergraduate students (121
females) from the University of Texas at Austin completed a 2
(Behavior: deception/honesty)×2 (Relationship: stranger/friend)×2
(Mobility: low/high) between-participants experiment as a require-
ment for an introductory management course.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to a low or high mobility
condition. Lowmobility participants received a scenario adapted from
Chen et al. (2009): “…Due to its government's labor policies, the job
mobility in Country X is extremely low…The majority of the people in
Country X have worked in only 1 or 2 jobs in the same occupation
throughout their lifetime. About one third of the people who are older
than 50 years of age still remain in their ﬁrst job.” Two graphs were
displayed to provide evidence for low mobility. High mobility
participants received information that “people in Country X have
worked in 3 to 6 jobs in different occupations throughout their
lifetime. The percentage of people who remain in their ﬁrst job
decreases drastically after the age of 30.” Two supporting graphs were
shown. Participants wrote an essay imagining that they were a citizen
of Country X and were preparing themselves for the job market. Next,
similar to Experiments 1 and 2, participants read about either a friend
or stranger who behaved deceptively or honestly.
Results and discussion
The reward or punishment amount was submitted to a Behavior×-
Relationship×Mobility between-participants ANOVA. As predicted, a
signiﬁcant three-way interaction emerged, F(1,199)=6.43, p=.01
(see Fig. 3).
High mobility participants rewarded honesty (M=76.48, SD=
29.53) more than they punished deception (M=40.80, SD=40.14),
F(1,100)=27.17, pb .001, d=.98. This effect was not moderated by
whether the actor was a stranger or a friend, F(1,100)=.97, p=.33.
Among low mobility participants, however, a signiﬁcant Beha-
vior×Relationship interaction emerged, F(1,99)=21.43, pb .001. In-
dividuals rewarded (M=59.29, SD=37.61) and punished (M=67.20,
SD=36.80) strangers in equivalent amounts, t(99)=.84, p=.40, but
they rewarded (M=75.60, SD=26.63) more than they punished
friends (M=20.80, SD=34.75), t(99)=5.64, pb .001, d=1.77. In other
words, low mobility participants marginally rewarded their friends
more than strangers, t(99)=1.73, p=.09, d=.50 and punished their
friends less than strangers, t(99)=4.78, pb .001, d=1.30. Therefore,
Fig. 2. The effects of partner's behavior, relationship, and culture on amount of
response, Experiment 2.
Fig. 3. The effects of partner's behavior, relationship, and social mobility on amount
of response, Experiment 3.
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we demonstrate for the ﬁrst time that social mobility has a causal role
that drives disparate reward and punishment patterns for friends
versus strangers.
General discussion
The current research sheds light on how East Asians and West-
erners react differently to honest and deceptive friends and strangers,
revealing social mobility as one causal mechanism that contributes to
this cross-cultural difference. The ﬁrst two experiments documented
that East Asians reward more than they punish friends, but reward
and punish strangers equivalently. Americans, however, reward
more than they punish regardless of whether the actor is their friend
or a stranger, as shown in Experiment 2. Notably, in Experiment 3,
the reward/punishment decisions of participants primed with high
mobility mirrored those of Americans in Experiment 2; similarly, the
reward/punishment decisions of participants primed with low
mobility mirrored those of East Asians in both Experiments 1 and 2.
A meta-analysis that tested the overall effect sizes across the exper-
iments (Table 1) showed that culture/mobility has divergent effects
depending on type of relationship with the actor: East Asian/low
mobility participants rewarded their friends more and punished them
less than they did toward strangers.
The current research is the ﬁrst to illuminate an underlying
mechanism that explains the cross-cultural disparity in rewarding
and punishing friends and strangers. The present ﬁndings suggest that
greater levels of social mobility are associatedwith rewarding honesty
more than punishing deception regardless of the relationshipwith the
actor. However, the type of relationship matters at lower levels of
mobility, with people rewarding more than punishing friends, but
rewarding and punishing strangers equivalently. To individuals in
more mobile societies, their relationships with both friends and
strangers are voluntarily formed. They can actively establish and
maintain these voluntarily formed relationships via rewards and at
the same time they can easily exit from negative relationships in-
stead of putting themselves under emotional stake to deliver punish-
ments. Thus, in reaction to both friends and strangers alike, they can
afford to reward more than they punish. Contrariwise, to individuals
in less mobile communities, the binding relationship with their
friends is coupled with the shared expectations of maintaining in-
group harmony and mitigating interpersonal conﬂict whenever
possible. Thus, socially immobile individuals might be obliged to
reward more than they punish their friends. For strangers with non-
binding relationships, they are rewarded to the same extent as they
are punished.
The psychological reality afforded by different levels of social
mobility is relevant not only when we compare across different
cultures, but also when we analyze different collectives within the
same culture. Individuals in the same culture have different levels of
perceived social mobility as they are not equally residentially mobile
(Oishi, 2010), professionally mobile (Chen et al., 2009), or relationally
mobile (Schug et al., 2010). Without taking into account the more
nuanced socio-psychological mechanism of social mobility, our
predictions would be erroneous if we merely adhere to the cultural
stereotypes of how East Asians and Westerners generally reward and
punish friends and strangers. More interestingly, as individuals are
likely to be a part of distinct residential, professional, and relational
networks characterized by different levels of mobility, it follows that
how they react to, for example, a deceptive neighbor they meet in the
residential community could be very different from how they react to
a deceptive coworker they meet at work.
Limitations and future considerations
Our experiments have limitations to take into account. First, as the
experiments were scenario-based, one possibility is that participants'
responses might have reﬂected cultural expectations. Future research
could address this limitation by using paradigms with real monetary
stakes (e.g., with actual costs to punish/reward; Wang et al., 2009;
Wang & Leung, 2010).
Moreover, future research should explore how different types of
deception and honesty may affect punishment and reward responses;
for example, deceived individuals who do not lose any money may
respond quite differently than deceived individuals in our experi-
ments, in which the act of deception resulted in a ﬁnancial loss (i.e.,
they received 50% less than expected).
Similar patterns of effects emerged in Experiments 1 and 2, while
measuring cultural responses, and in Experiment 3, while manipu-
lating social mobility. Whereas Experiment 3 suggests that social
mobility could be a mechanism driving cross-cultural differences in
reward and punishment, it is possible that the social mobility effect
is an independent one from the cultural responses. Future research
could investigate more directly whether social mobility is the central
mechanism driving the cultural responses in reward and punishment,
as well as explore other socio-psychological mechanisms relevant to
decisions to reward and punish.
Conclusion
The current research proposes a novel perspective to understand
the psychological dynamics underlying individuals' reward and
punishment behaviors by taking into account the psychological
reality given rise by social mobility in different cultures. The
mechanism of social mobility is particularly relevant to the modern
world in which individuals are likely to form compartmentalized
relationship networks that are differentially mobile. Understanding
how social mobility comes into play in different cultures' relationship
networks (e.g., friends vs. strangers) will give us a more complete
picture of understanding people's choices to reward benevolent
behaviors and punish unethical transgressions.
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